(Sh) How much does each supplier earn under the Beltrand-Nash Equilibrium in (g) [accounting for the investment cost}? Are payoffs lower or higher in this equilibrium than in the other two Bertrand-Nash equilibria (considered above)? Consider the following two-stage game. 1. First, each supplier simultaneously and independently decides whether to invest in the new teclmology at a cost of $500. 2. Second: with each supplier having made hise'her investment decision {revealed to each other). each supplier simultaneously and independently decides on the price to charge for hisfher product. So the second stage of this game is the Bertrand game, conditional on each supplier's first stage investment decision. This two-stage game can be solved using backward induction first solve the second stage game for each possible outcome of the rst stage and then solve the first stage. You've actually done the rst step of the induction in the earlier parts of this question (3i) Fill-in the following payoff matrix for the first-stage \"investment game" using your answers from (2d), (Bf), {2h} Sarah Jot- Nut Invest HINT: The payoffs 'om the Nash-Bertrand Equilibrium where Sarah invests but .Toe does not are symmetric to the case where Joe invests but Sarah does not. [3j] Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this \"investment game.\" (31:) Explain why this \"investment game\" is a \"Prisoner's Dilemma" game. Who benefits the most 'om the availability of this new low cost technology: Joe. Sarah, or consumers