Short Answer Part 1 Consider this as a simultaneous-move (static) game: Player B Left Right Top 5, 1 0. 4 Player A Bottom 1, 3 2, 4 1.a) Write down the Best Response Correspondence for each of the two players. 1.b) Does any player have a dominant strategy in this game? Explain. 1.c) Find all Nash Equilibria in pure strategies of this game. 1.d) Is there any Nash Equilibria in mixed strategies? If so, find it. Short Answer Part 2 Consider the following sequential-move game: Player 1 R Player 2 Player 2 R R Player 3 Player 3 Player 3 Player 3 R R R R Player 1 2 5 O Player 2 5 Player 3 2 Find the backward-induction equilibrium of this game