The election of 1844 featured two major-party candidates (The democrats nominated James K. Polk and the Whigs, Henry Clay), with a final electoral vote count of 170 for Polk and 105 for Clay. Polk was a strong supporter of the entry of new slave states into the union, while Clay (himself a slave owner) opposed the addition of new slave states. James Birney entered the race as a committed abolitionist for the liberty party and manage to secure 2.3 percent of the popular vote overall.

Here are the results for the State of NY (with electoral votes) in the elections of 1844: Polk, 48.8% of the popular votes - Clay, 47.85% - Birney, 3.25%

In the following analysis assume that Birney voters strictly preferred Clay to Polk:

a) Suppose that NY's electoral votes were allocated according to sequential runoff. Who would win the election? Why?

b) Suppose that NY's electoral votes were allocated according to approval voting. Suggest a scenario where Clay wins the election. How plausible do you think your scenario is?

c) Social choice theorists have suggested that "independence of entry of clones" might be useful criterion for judging voting rules. IEC states that addition of candidate identical (or very similar) to one of the current candidates should not cause the winner of the election to change. Does plurality rule satisfy IEC? What about approval voting? Do you think this isa reasonable criterion for a voting rule to satisfy?