This is from a game theory in economics course for context:

Two players are bargaining over how to split one dollar. Both players write shares they would like to have, 0 s₁ 1 and 0 s₂ 1, on a piece of paper and then show them to each other at the same time. If s₁ + s₂ 1, then the players receive the shares they named; if s₁ + s₂ > 1, then both players receive zero.

(a) What are Player 1's best responses to Player 2's actions 0 s₂ 1?

(b) What are Player 2's best responses to Player 1's actions 0 s₁ 1?

(c) Does Player 1 have any weakly dominated strategies in this game? Explain.

(d) Draw the best response diagram.

(e) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game.

(f) Are s₁ and s₂ strategic complements or substitutes? Explain.

(g) If the game was played sequentially, would Player 1 want to move first or second? Relate your answer to the one you gave in (f).