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Why doesn't the discipline of repeated dealings and multilateral punishment strategies work in the case of violent theft? What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
- Why doesn't the discipline of repeated dealings and multilateral punishment strategies work in the case of violent theft?
- What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in presence of threat of violent theft when producers and middlemen interact? Why could this equilibrium be undesirable?
- What are the two mechanisms that were used by producers and middlemen to escape this Nash equilibrium? Describe how these mechanisms work. What were their effects from an incentive viewpoint on the part of middlemen?
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Macroeconomics
Authors: N. Gregory Mankiw, William M. Scarth
5th Canadian Edition
1464168504, 978-1464168505
