You are given the following best-response functions for duopoly rms playing a Bertrand price-setting game: p1 =25 +0.5m1+ 0.25p2, and p2 =25 +0.5m2 + 0.25p1, where m1 and m2 are the marginal costs for rm 1 and rm 2 respectively. Let m1 = m2 = $10. Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium prices. Firm 1 $ 40 (round answers to the nearest penny) Firm 2 $ 40 (round answers to the nearest penny) Let n11 =$30 and m2 = $10, Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium prices, Firm 1 $ (round answers to the nearest penny) Firm 2 $ (round answers to the nearest penny)