You make very tasty hot dogs. You can do hot dog business in two potential monopoly markets: one inside Fenway Park, Boston's baseball stadium, and one inside TD Garden, the home arena for Boston's ice hockey team, the Bruins, and basketball team, the Celtics. The demand for hot dogs in each game in Fenway Park is QFenway = 100 - 5p and the demand for hot dogs per game in TD Garden is QTD = 50 - 5p. You need to pay 100 dollars per game for renting the space in each market. The cost of making a hot dog is 2 dollars. Assume that you can sell fractions of hot dogs. What will the price of hot dogs in each market be if you enter both markets? PFenway =Now suppose that Fenway Park has space for another potential hot dog seller. who can make the same hot dogs with the same marginal cost as you and has to pay the same amount of rent. Customers will always buy from the cheaper seller, but when the price is the same, they are indifferent and buy randomly (that is. each seller gets hahc ofthe customers]. In the questions that are part of this problem. assume hot dog sellers are competing over price [not quantity]. If you and the other hot dog seller agreed to charge the same price that maximizes each's prot, what would this price be? p