Determined to compete with fuel-efficient Volkswagen and Japanese imports, the Ford Motor Company introduced the subcompact Pinto in the 1971 model year. Lee Iacocca, Ford’s president at the time, insisted that the Pinto weigh no more than 2,000 pounds and cost no more than $2,000. Even with these restrictions, the Pinto met federal safety standards, although some people have argued that strict adherence to the restrictions led Ford engineers to compromise safety. Some 2 million units were sold during the 10-year life of the Pinto.

The Pinto’s major design flaw—a fuel tank prone to rupturing with moderate-speed rear-end collisions—surfaced not too long after the Pinto’s entrance to the market. In April 1974, the Center for Auto Safety petitioned the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to recall Ford Pintos because of the fuel-tank design defect. The Center for Auto Safety’s petition was based on reports from attorneys of three deaths and four serious injuries in moderate-speed, rear-end collisions involving Pintos. The NHTSA did not act on this petition until 1977.

As a result of tests performed for the NHTSA, as well as the extraordinary amount of publicity generated by the problem, Ford agreed, on June 9, 1978, to recall 1.5 million 1971–1976 Ford Pintos and 30,000 1975–1976 Mercury Bobcat sedan and hatchback models for modifications to the fuel tank. Recall notices were mailed to the affected Pinto and Bobcat owners in September 1978. Repair parts were to be delivered to all dealers by September 15, 1978.

Unfortunately, the recall was initiated too late for six people. Between June 9 and September 15, 1978, six people died in Pinto fires after a rear impact. Three of these people were teenage girls killed in Indiana in August 1978 when their 1973 Pinto burst into flames after being rear-ended by a van. The fiery deaths of the Indiana teenagers led to criminal prosecution of the Ford Motor Company on charges of reckless homicide, marking the first time that an American corporation was prosecuted on criminal charges. In the trial, which commenced on January 15, 1980, “Indiana state prosecutors alleged that Ford knew Pinto gasoline tanks were prone to catch fire during rear-end collisions but failed to warn the public or fix the problem out of concern for profits.” On March 13, 1980, a jury found Ford innocent of the charges. Production of the Pinto was discontinued in the fall of 1980.

Enter Ford’s Field Recall Coordinator

Dennis A. Gioia, currently a professor in the Department of Management and Organization at Pennsylvania State University, was the field recall coordinator at Ford Motor Company when the Pinto fuel-tank defect began unfolding. Gioia’s responsibilities included the operational coordination of all the current recall campaigns, tracking incoming information to identify developing problems, and reviewing field reports of alleged component failures that led to accidents. Gioia left Ford in 1975. Subsequently, “reports of Pinto fires escalated, attracting increasing media attention.” The remainder of this case, written in the first-person and in Gioia’s own words in the early 1990s, is his personal reflection on lessons learned from his experiences involving the Pinto fuel-tank problem.

Why Revisit Decisions from the Early 1970s?

I take this case very personally, even though my name seldom comes up in its many recountings. I was one of those “faceless bureaucrats” who is often portrayed as making decisions without accountability and then walking away from them—even decisions with life-and-death implications. That characterization is, of course, far too stark and superficial. I certainly don’t consider myself faceless, and I have always chafed at the label of bureaucrat as applied to me, even though I have found myself unfairly applying it to others. Furthermore, I have been unable to walk away from my decisions in this case. They have a tendency to haunt—especially when they have had such public airings as those involved in the Pinto fires debacle have had.

But why revisit 20-year-old decisions, and why take them so personally? Here’s why: because I was in a position to do something about a serious problem . . . and didn’t. That simple observation gives me pause for personal reflection and also makes me think about the many difficulties people face in trying to be ethical decision makers in organizations. It also helps me to keep in mind the features of modern business and organizational life that would influence someone like me (me of all people, who purposely set out to be an ethical decision maker!) to overlook basic moral issues in arriving at decisions that, when viewed retrospectively, look absurdly easy to make. But they are not easy to make, and that is perhaps the most important lesson of all.....

Questions for Discussion

1. The Ford Pinto met federal safety standards, yet it had a design flaw that resulted in serious injuries and deaths. Is simply meeting safety standards a sufficient product design goal of ethical companies?

2. Gioia uses the notion of script schemas to help explain why he voted to not initiate a recall of the Ford Pinto. In your opinion, is this a justifiable explanation?

3. How can organizational context influence the decisions made by organizational members?

4. If you had been in Gioia’s position, what would you have done? Why?

5. Describe the four key decision-making lessons that Gioia identifies for neophyte decision makers. Discuss how you expect or intend to use these four lessons in your own career.