For the hawkdove game of Example 14.11 (page 624), where D > 0 and R > 0,

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For the hawk–dove game of Example 14.11 (page 624), where D > 0 and R > 0, each agent is trying to maximize its utility. Is there a Nash equilibrium with a randomized strategy? What are the probabilities? What is the expected payoff to each agent? (These should be expressed as functions of R and D.) Show your calculations.

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