1) a) Suppose that candidates a and b are in a lopsided race, so 58% of the populations feel that b > a, and 42% that a b > a. Would this be a sound investment under either plurality rule or sequential runoff? Assume sincere voting.

b) Now consider a different three-way race where opinion polls report the following;

40% feel a > b > c

31% feel c > b > a

29% feel b > a > c

Who will be the winner if an election were held today under SR? Suppose that by campaigning hard a is able to steal 3% of c's voters. Who would win the election now? Which of the properties employed in May's Theorem has been violated in this example?

c) Based on your answer to a and b, does sequential runoff have desirable normative properties? What do you think about sequential runoff as a voting system on practical grounds?

2) Here are the first- and second- ranked preferences for several groups of voters in a thirteen-member voting body that uses STV with the droop quota: b > d (4 people); b > e (3 member); c > e (2); e > c (2); d > b (1); and a > d (1). The group wishes to select 3 outcomes from a, b, c, d, e. Which three do they select?