2. (1 point) Explain the intuition behind both first mover advantage" and "second mover advantage". 3. (1 point) Construct a limit pricing type game in which the limit pricing (keeping the entrant out) is not successful in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Write out a brief description of what happens. 4. (1 point) Construct an entry deterrence type game in which the entry deterrence (keeping the entrant out) is not successful in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Write out a brief description of what happens. 5. (1 point) Construct a commitment type game in which the commitment is not successful (in keeping the entrant out) in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Write out a brief description of what happens. 6. (1 point) Briefly explain why cost-plus pricing may be less than optimal, and describe the conditions under which it will work well.