2 Customer discrimination There are several competitive rms and two types of workers, type A (majority workers) and type B (minority workers). Each rm can produce at most one unit of a product by hiring one worker, either a type A worker or a type B worker. The price customers are willing to pay for a unit of the product is p > 0, but there is a fraction a of customers who are willing to pay only p d > 0 if the product was produced by a type B worker. Therefore, a rm hiring a type A worker sells at price p while a rm hiring a type B worker sells at the expected price 04(1) d) + (1 a)p = p ad. Suppose that workers are willing to work at any wage but there are many more rms than workers of each type and so rms end up bidding up their wages to hire workers. Find the equilibrium wages of type A and type B workers as a function of a