3. Recall the electoral game that gives us the median voter theorem voters on a leftlight spectrum who vote for the candidate closest to their beliefs. For this question, use the simplest possible setup: voters spread evenly, with the far left position labeled \"[1\" and the far right position labeled \"1" [see Figure 15.9, panel {a} on page til? in the hook}. Keep in mind that this is modeled as a simultaneous game, which is actually not how campaigning works in real life... In this game, a pure strategy is a candidate choosing a position on the line. A mixed strategyr would place some randomization with multiple positions being possible. Assume there are two candidates. When we oonsider pure strategies, we get- a single NE bot-h locate at the median. If we eonsider mixed strategies, is there a MSNE? Give details. If there is one (or more] MSNEs, describe one including how it is a MSNE. If there are not any MSNEs, explain in detail why not. (a) Uniform distribution (b) Normal distribution Voter Voter mass mass 0 0.5 X 0 0.5 Political Political position position FIGURE 15.9 Continuous Voter Distributions