Consider a second price auction model with twelve participants. The valuations of the 12 participants are common knowledge amongst the bidders. The auctioneer does not know those values. Consider now the valuation profile of the twelve participants: valuation profile: (100,95, 90,85, 80, 75, 70, 65, 60, 55, 50, 45) Also let the following be the bid profile: bid profile: (95, 94, 91, 85, 81, 74, 100, 75, 65, 55, 50, 200) Verify whether the bid profile is a Nash Equilibrium or not? Also, identify a Nash equilibrium for 12 participants with the above valuations in which the participant with valuation 45 wins the auction. Consider a second price auction model with twelve participants. The valuations of the 12 participants are common knowledge amongst the bidders. The auctioneer does not know those values. Consider now the valuation profile of the twelve participants: valuation profile: (100,95, 90,85, 80, 75, 70, 65, 60, 55, 50, 45) Also let the following be the bid profile: bid profile: (95, 94, 91, 85, 81, 74, 100, 75, 65, 55, 50, 200) Verify whether the bid profile is a Nash Equilibrium or not? Also, identify a Nash equilibrium for 12 participants with the above valuations in which the participant with valuation 45 wins the auction