Consider a two-sided platform that matches men and women who are interested in finding a marriage partner. The platform sets a price for men to access the platform and a price for women to access the platform. These prices are chosen to maximizes the platform's profits. Assume the platform is the only one in the market. a. What determines which gender pays a higher price? b. Suppose a massive immigration wave occurs that increases the fraction of young men in the population relative to young women. How will this affect the male and female prices on the platform? c. Suppose the value of marrying exogenously increased for men, while the value of marrying for women was unchanged. Hence, in terms of figure 9.9, the benefit curve rises for men and is unchanged for women. What will happen to the price for men to access the platform? What about the price for women to access the platform? d. Now suppose a second platform enters the market. Legislation is passed that allows a man to belong to both platforms but permits a woman to belong to at most one platform. Will this leg- islation tend to cause the access price for women to be higher or lower than the access price for men?