Consider an auction environment that matches the symmetric independent private values specification discussed in class. This means that all of the bidders in the auction know their own values for the item with certainty but they do not know the value held by other bidders. They do know that the values held by the other bidders are independently distributed according to a uniform distribution between 0 and 100. For the questions below, refer to the following specific value examples: Explain the equilibrium bidding strategy for a second price auction. For each bidder in each of the example auctions compute the equilibrium bid in a second-price auction. Identify which bidder would win and what they would pay. Explain the equilibrium bidding strategy for a first price auction (you don't have to give a full derivation). For each bidder in each of the example auctions compute the equilibrium bid in a first-price auction. Identify which bidder would win and what they would pay. Assume that the actual bids placed by the bidders are as given in the table below. Find the winner and the price they would pay in both auction formats. Calculate the efficiency achieved. Looking at the results in parts a and b (ignore c) and from what you have learned in class, if you were conducting an auction in this environment, explain which auction format you would choose and why