explain the following quotes in six to seven sentences from "Financial Incentives and Central Bank Authority in Industrializing Nations". Do not just state what the quote is explicitly saying.

Quote 1

"This article suggests that the impact of central bank behavior on inflation in developing countries cannot simply be attributed to legal status. Delegation of authority to proto-central banking institutions is shaped by the financial interests of those with authority to delegate: governments and private banks. The behavior of early central banking institutions tends to reinforce the financial conditions from which they emerged. This financial structure creates incentives for government politicians, private financiers, and industrialists to support the central banking status quo, and it accounts for nation- al continuity and cross-national variation in central bank behavior" (584)

Quote 2

"In contrast to Thai and Mexican industry, which relied on internal funds and to some extent foreign financing, Korean industry was heavily dependent on domestic bank credit. The heavy reliance of Korean industry is partly due to the government's decision to push for extremely rapid industrial development. In the context of a war-devastated economy in which few actual entrepreneurs existed and potential ones had virtually no private capital, any industrialization effort would have required substantial financing beyond that available to entrepreneurs from their own sources" (582)

Quote 3

"Central banking institutions, or their precursors, founded by states ing to resolve their own fiscal problems, can anticipate a future o out the government and/or weak commercial banks overburdened with increasingly devalued government bills and bonds. The government's financial prospects dictate its willingness to delegate authority to the central bank. Where government deficits relative to revenue are high, government typically seeks a central bank that is subject to close executive direction and unrestrained in its ability to finance the state and other favored actors. This is consistent with Cukierman's hypothesis that the greater a government's financial needs relative to resources and/or the larger its internal debt, the less likely there is to be an independent central bank" (564)

Quote 4

"The problem with using legal independence as a comparative indicator of central bank authority is reinforced by another case. The legal independence of the South Korean central bank is the same as that of the Bank of Thailand, yet the Bank of Korea has very little actual authority. In South Korea a central planning agency, the Economic Planning Board, is closely allied with the Finance Ministry, and together the two agencies control virtually all economic policy" (561)

Quote 5

"Central bank authority is probably best evaluated by using classic indicators of power: number of instances in which a central bank achieves compliance with its policy preferences from those opposed and, more subtly, number of instances in which a central bank manages to keep opposing policy options off the policy agenda entirely. These sorts of measures of central bank authority are difficult to attain for large numbers of country cases or for long periods of time in a single country" (560)

Quote 6

"Central banks shape monetary policy, affect exchange rates, and guard financial stability. They have an impact on economic variables that are crucial to national development and growth and also play a role in determining the nature of international financial and monetary cooperation. Coordination of monetary policy is increasingly necessary to maintain stable exchange rates and international capital flows" (556)

Quote 7

"Yet two problems confront institutionalist approaches to central banking in developing countries. First, formal, or legal, central bank independence does not appear to be related to low inflation in developing countries; that is, there is a considerable disjuncture between formal independence, on the one hand, and actual central bank behavior and capacity, on the other. By contrast, de facto authority does appear correlated with low inflation. The second problem in the literature follows from the first. If legal independence does not necessarily explain the likelihood of successful anti-inflationary efforts by a central bank, one needs to look elsewhere for an explanation of central bank behavior and capacity" (557)

Quote 8

"This article contends that the interests and capacities of early central banking institutions are shaped by the financial interests of those in a position to delegate authority to central banks: government politicians and private banks. Central banks both reflect and reinforce financial interests and structures" (557)

Link: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2950718.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A9f49588f27f145e03dab2a05e495e884&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1