On May 29, 2008, the plaintiffs' attorney, Glenn Coe, met the defendants for mediation. At the mediation, Coe made a detailed offer of settlement with the defendants. The defendants rejected this proposal, and afterward negotiations continued, during which Coe made an offer to settle the litigation through a series of conversations with the attorneys who represented the defendant Bank of America. During a two-day period in June 2008, Coe expressly assured the defendants' attorneys on separate occasions, in response to direct questioning on the issue, that the settlement offer pro- posed by him at that time was fully authorized by his clients as well as the additional plaintiffs' attorney, and that if accepted by the defendants, it would resolve the litigation. The final settlement demand by the plaintiffs' counsel to the Bank of America was the sum of $1.1 million. The Bank of America accepted the $1.1 million settlement proposal on July 1, 2008, prior to the 5 p.m. deadline. At this time, the global settle- ment offer had been accepted by all defendants. At no time prior to the acceptance of the settlement proposal were the defendants or their attorneys notified that the offer had been withdrawn, unauthorized, or otherwise ineffective. After the proposal had been accepted by the defendants, the plaintiffs sued the defendants, claiming that the plaintiffs' lead attorney, Glenn Coe, lacked the authority to make several settle- ment proposals or bind them to a global settlement agreement with Bank of America and the other defendants. The defendants filed motions to enforce the settlement agreement, and the supe- rior court granted the defendants' motions and rendered judg ments for defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. JUDGE ZARELLA The principal issue in this consolidated appeal ... is whether the plaintiffs' attorney had apparent [continued] authority to make settlement proposals, engage in settle- ment discussions and bind the plaintiffs to a global settle- ment agreement with the defendants. The plaintiffs claim that the trial court's enforcement of a settlement agreement between the parties, based on a finding of apparent authority on the part of the plaintiffs' attorney to bind the plaintiffs to the agreement, was clearly erroneous in the absence of conduct by the plaintiffs (1) manifesting that their attorney had authority to settle the pending litigation, and (2) leading the opposing defense attorneys reasonably to believe that the plaintiffs' attorney had full and final authority to settle the litigation, as distinguished from authority only to negotiate. The plaintiffs also claim that they were denied their right to a jury trial on issues of fact under article first, 19, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by article four of the amendments, when the trial court, in the midst of voir dire, made findings of fact and determined that the litigants had reached a settlement of the pending litigation. The defen- dants respond that the trial court's finding that the plaintiffs' counsel had apparent authority to settle the litigation was not clearly erroneous and that the plaintiffs had no right to a jury trial on their equitable motions seeking to enforce the agree- ment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Since the case of Tomlinson v. Board of Education, the court's inquiry as to the doctrine of apparent authority is now refined to a two part analysis. Apparent authority exists, one, where the principal held the agent out as possessing CRITICAL THINKING Is any important information missing from this decision that might further clarify the nature of the issue of agency between the concerned parties? Could it change the accept- ability of the judge's reasoning? sufficient authority to embrace the act in question and know- ingly permitted him to act as having such authority; and, two. in consequence thereof, the person dealing with the agent acting in good faith reasonably believed under all the circum- stances that the agent had the necessary authority.... Based upon the court's prior findings in this matter, the court finds that [Coe] certainly did have apparent authority from his client[s]. Further... the court so finds, [it was] acknowl- edged in testimony, that the defendants' counsel reasonably believed that [Coe] was, in fact, authorized by the plaintiffs to make the settlement offer at issue, and further, that [the] defendants' counsel at all... relevant times were acting in good faith in their respective efforts to settle the case on the terms proposed by [Coe]. As noted earlier, [Coe] had been, in fact, engaged in set- tlement discussions with his client's obvious assent. [Rena Ackerman] had accompanied him to the mediation for over [one] month prior to the time the settlement was reached. [Coe] was certainly held out as being authorized to negoti- ate settlement on behalf of the plaintiffs and the defendants acted reasonably in believing that he had authority to do so. [Coe] acknowledged in testimony that both [Wyld] and [Schneider] acted reasonably in relying on his stated author- ity. Further, there was no evidence at all that [Coe's] appar- ent authority had been terminated at any time by [Rena] Ackerman. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. AFFIRMED. ETHICAL DECISION MAKING Does this ruling appear to follow a coherent ethical guide- line? If so, what form does it take? Who are the stakehold- ers in this situation? Are they awarded proper consideration under the selected ethical guideline?