Q.11 Consider a market with 3 firms and 2 customers. Firms 1 and 2 make CD players and firm 3 makes CDs. The CDs that firm 3 makes can be played on the CD players produced by any of the firms. Each of the two customers is interested in buying one CD player and one CD. CD players without any CD are useless. Similarly CDs without CD players have no value. Customer A has a reservation price of 300 for a combination of CD player 1 (that is the CD player made by firm 1) and a CD but a reservation price of 100 for a combination of CD player 2 (that is the CD player made by firm 2) and a CD. Customer B has a reservation price of 100 for a combination of CD player 1 (that is the CD player made by firm 1) and a CD but a reservation price of 300 for a combination of CD player 2 (that is the CD player made by firm 2) and a CD. Customers make purchasing decisions to maximize consumer surplus. Costs for each of the three firms equals O. Bunty claims that it is a Nash Equilibrium for firm 1 to sell its CD player for 200, firm 2 to sell its CD player for 200 and for firm C to sell its CDs for 100