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1. Consider the innitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma stage game G2 with strategies (a3, ac) and payoffs thing, :13) as given in the himatrix, where z > y > 1. Col: 0 D R0W.ol.Mo,z 0 Game G 2 (a) Suppose the discount rate is 6, write out the discounted sum of payoffs given an arbitrary sequence of actions ((1%, \"Elf;- (b) Write out the discounted-average sum of payoffs. (c) Draw the set of feasible payoffs of the game G2, where we will assume that g > y. ((1) Describe, either mathematically, or with a diagram, strategies for both players that: 1. Act as a Grim trigger on (C, 0) ii. Alternate between (C, D) and then (D, C), with any deviation by either player punished by D forever. (e) What are the conditions on 5 (as a function of 3:, y ,2) necessary for (C, C') forever to be an equilibrium outcome under the grim trigger? (f) What is the condition on 6 for the alternation of (QB) and (13,0) forever to be a sub-gameperfect equilibrium outcome under the threat of a punishment of deviate forever