Two firms compete with each other in a market

_ [Ii-l} total points] Two Firms compete with each other in a marketJI selling a product that is an imperfect substitute of each other. Suppose these two Firms compete in prices, with p. being the price set by rm 1 and p: the price set by rm 2. Suppose these rms' bestresponse Functions are given by the following equations, BRI {p2} = 2 +151, [Best-response Function of rm I as a function oF the pl] 1 Blip = 4+3 ~p1, {Best-response function oF rm 2 as a Function ofttle :31} In what follows, suppose the government has set a price price ceiling of p = 2|] in this inclus try, so we must have I] 5 p1 5 2D and 5 F1 5 2'!) {these are the game's strategy spaces}. [a] [HI points] Is this a game oF strategic complements or strategic substitutes? Explain. {b} [HI points] Characterize the \"reduced-game R." as the range of prices p1 and F: that are bestresponses to some price in the game's original stratng space. [E] [HI points] Characterize the \"reduced-game R1" as the range of prices p1 and F: that are best-responses to some price in the game's reducedgame R1. [cl] [HI points] Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium {PSN'E} oF the game. Are PSNE prices below the government price ceiling of $20