Consider the following three-player game in strategic form.

Each player has two strategies: Player I has the strategies \(T\) and \(B\) (the top and bottom row), player II has the strategies \(l\) and \(r\) (the left and right column in each \(2 \times 2\) panel), and player III has the strategies \(L\) and \(R\) (the right or left panel). The payoffs to the players in each cell are given as triples of numbers to players I, II, III.

(a) Identify all pairs of strategies where one strategy strictly, or weakly, dominates the other.

(b) Apply iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies to this game. What are the equilibria of the game?

I II II r I r I T 3,4,4 1,3,3 T 4,0,5 0,1,6 B 8,1,4 2,0,6 B 5,1,3 1,2,5 III: L III: R