1. Assume 1000 consumers are uniformly distributed along a Hotelling market line of unit length. There are two firms, firm 1 is located at the West end of town (x=0). Firm 2 is located at the East end of town (x=1). Consumers do not know about either product but, if they did, each would have a maximum willingness to pay for the product equal to V>20t. Each firm can use advertising to inform consumers but can only do so in blocks equal to one-half of the market. For example, firm 1 can inform customers located from x=0 to x=21; or from x=41 to x=43; or from x=31 to x=65; and so on. The same is of course true for firm 2. Firms choose their advertising strategy (what block of half the consumers to inform) first and then compete in prices. To which set of customers will firm 1 advertise, i.e., what block of consumers will it choose to send ads? To which set of consumers will firm 2 advertise? What price will each firm charge in this equilibrium? 1. Assume 1000 consumers are uniformly distributed along a Hotelling market line of unit length. There are two firms, firm 1 is located at the West end of town (x=0). Firm 2 is located at the East end of town (x=1). Consumers do not know about either product but, if they did, each would have a maximum willingness to pay for the product equal to V>20t. Each firm can use advertising to inform consumers but can only do so in blocks equal to one-half of the market. For example, firm 1 can inform customers located from x=0 to x=21; or from x=41 to x=43; or from x=31 to x=65; and so on. The same is of course true for firm 2. Firms choose their advertising strategy (what block of half the consumers to inform) first and then compete in prices. To which set of customers will firm 1 advertise, i.e., what block of consumers will it choose to send ads? To which set of consumers will firm 2 advertise? What price will each firm charge in this equilibrium