A seller can make a costly investment to make her product more valuable for the buyer. If the seller invests x, then her cost is x2 and the value of the buyer is v + x, where v > 0. a) Assume that the game has three stages. The seller chooses x. The buyer observes x and offers a price p 0. Finally, the seller observes p and either accepts or rejects the offer. In the latter case, the payoff of the buyer is zero whereas the payoff of the seller is - x2 . Find the subgame perfect equilibria of this game. b) Consider the same scenario except that it is the seller who makes a price offer and the buyer who responds. Find the subgame perfect equilibria of this game. c) Suppose now that the buyer can commit to give a share [0,1] of his value to the seller and the seller after observing , chooses investment. Find the subgame perfect equilibria.