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Questions and Answers of Management And Artificial Intelligence

4 Many retailers offer warranties on the goods they sell, whether they be electronic products (computers, stereo components), white goods(washing machines and fridges), or cars.
(e) Suppose a group of local wine producers formed a Wine Growers Association which published a monthly wine magazine which was distributed to consumers free-of-charge. If you were a wine producer,
(d) How important is the cost of wine magazines or wine appreciation courses? Would you change your answers to parts 3b and 3c if the government subsidized wine appreciation courses?
(c) Would a producer want to produce a higher-quality wine if more wine magazines were published or more wine appreciation courses were offered.
(b) Discuss the wine producer’s incentive to produce a high-quality wine as a function of the number of wine experts in the economy.
(a) Does an informational asymmetry exist between wine producers and this wine consumer? What type of information problem exists?
3 Suppose a consumer is initially unaware of the quality of wine. As we discussed in this chapter, the consumer could use price as a signal of the quality of wine. But another option would be to do
2 What would happen to the consumer’s perception of quality if BMW started producing a pick-up truck which sold for the same price as comparable trucks produced by Ford, General Motors, or
(d) Would you expect a Law School which did not require an LSAT score as an admission requirement to be a higher- or lower-quality School?
(c) Short of asking an applicant whether they took a Preparation Class, can you think of anything that a Law School can do to resolve the information problem in question 1b?
(b) There exist many LSAT Preparation Classes in which applicants can enroll to prepare for the LSAT, but these Classes are costly. Some applicants incur this cost to take a Preparation Class, but
(a) What sort of information could a Law School deduce from an applicant’s LSAT score? What sort of information problem could this correct?
1 University Law Schools typically require applicants to their programs to write a uniform Law School Admissions Test (LSAT).
(c) Now suppose ψ = 1 > so all consumers know that L sells the lowestquality good, and H sells the highest-quality good. If producer L can advertise to make consumers believe he is producing a
(b) Now suppose the producers can advertise the quality of their product.If ψ = 0 initially, does increased advertising make the market more or less competitive? Can you relate your answer to the
(a) Suppose producers cannot advertise. Of all the models we have discussed so far, which is most appropriate for this market? Is one model more appropriate for the ψ informed consumers? Would you
4 Consider an industry where two producers sell a product which is differentiated only by quality, in a market where a share 0 < ψ < 1 of consumers are aware of the quality of the product being
whether dentist’s services are search goods, experience goods, or credence goods
whether advertising by dentists would be predatory or cooperative
the effectiveness of advertising by dentists
profitability in the dentist industry When making your recommendation, what account would you take of:
quality of dentist’s services
price of dentist’s services
Would you want to allow advertising by dentists, or would you rather ban advertising by dentists? What effect would your recommendation have on:
Suppose you were a government official in charge of regulating advertising by dentists.
3 In many countries, associations of professionals (dentists, for example)argue that advertising should not be allowed in their industry because it increases competition, creating incentives for
(d) Use your answers to parts 2b and 2c to verify the optimal share of advertising expenditures out of total revenue according to the monopolist’s rule of thumb: εa/εp = a/(p · q).
(c) Use the demand function to solve for the elasticity of demand with respect to the market price εp and with respect to advertising expenditures εa.
(b) Solve for the two first-order maximization conditions, and use them to solve for the monopolist’s optimal market price p* and level of advertising expenditures a*.
(a) Write out the monopolist’s profit function, as a function of the market price p and advertising expenditures a.
2 A monopolist produces a single output q with constant marginal cost c and zero fixed costs. He faces the following demand function:where p is the market price per unit of output and a is
1 In the example in Figure 8.2, what would the payoff matrix look like if advertising by both firms increased each firms revenues by $6 instead of$4? Does this change the Nash equilibrium? Can you
(b) Suppose instead that Nash equilibrium prices were given by:where 1 − a − b < 1. Would an increase in a result in an increase or softening of price competition? Would firm 2’s response be
(a) Will firm 2 respond by increasing or decreasing its price? Does the change in firm 1’s location result in increased or softened price competition?
(c) What happens to market share and profits for each firm as a result of the increase in costs at firm 1?4 Firm 1 and firm 2 sell a similar but differentiated product, charging market price p1 and
(b) What happens to each firm’s price as a result of the increase in costs at firm 1?
(a) What happens to firm 1’s reaction function? What happens to firm 2’s reaction function?
3 Using the information in the previous question, suppose that workers at firm 1 go on strike and demand a higher wage. To settle the dispute, managers at firm 1 increase wages paid to workers, so
(e) Do firms earn positive profits in equilibrium? Does this result confirm or contradict the Bertrand paradox? Explain your answer.
(d) Use the equations of each firm’s reaction function from part (b) to solve for each firm’s equilibrium price pi, level of output qi, and profits .
(c) On a graph with p1 on the horizontal axis and p2 on the vertical axis, graph each firm’ reaction function.
(b) Solve for each firm’s first-order condition, and use it to solve for each firm’s reaction function.
(a) Write out each firm’s profit function, of the form
2 Suppose two firms sell products in a particular market, but consumers do not regard the output of each firm as perfectly identical. The two firms face the following demand curves:Each firm has the
1 Can you use the model of product differentiation to explain the fact that all major brewers introduced a type of ice beer within a very short period of each other? Is this an example of maximal or
5 Refer to Figure 6.3. What would happen if firm 2’s reaction function were steeper than firm 1’s reaction function? Can you relate your answer to stability of the Cournot equilibrium?
4 Suppose that the market demand function is given by:as in Section 6.1.1. Each firm has zero fixed costs and constant marginal cost of productionc. An increase in demand causes the demand function
Using the same demand and cost functions, suppose that firms competed in prices instead of quantities. Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium, including market demand, market price, and profits earned by
2 Suppose instead that firm 1 was the Stackelberg leader in this market. Rewrite firm 1’s profit function, using firm 2’s reaction function, and solve for the Stackelberg equilibrium. Once
(d) Use the demand function to solve for the equilibrium market price, and then solve for the level of profits earned by each firm in equilibrium.
(c) Solve for the Cournot equilibrium
(b) Use the two first-order conditions to solve for each firm’s reaction function, and plot these two reaction functions.
(a) Write out each firm’s profit function, and solve for the two first-order profit-maximization conditions.
1 Consider a market where two firms are competing in quantities. Suppose that the market inverse demand function is given by:Each firm has zero fixed costs and constant marginal cost of production c.
(b) Is firm 2’s best response to ? Why or why not? If not, would firm 2 rather increase or decrease ?5 Repeat Question 4 when actions are strategic complements.6 Consider the reaction functions as
(a) Suppose firm 2 adopts a strategy . Identify firm 1’s best response to and label it .
4 Use a diagram with reaction functions as in Figure 5.8 when actions are strategic substitutes. Notice that when firm 1’s strategy s1 is on the horizontal axis, its reaction function R1 is steeper
(c) Is there a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) in this game? Is this game similar to any of the examples of Section 5.4?
(b) Find each player’s best-response strategy, given the strategy played by his/her opponent. Does either player have a dominant strategy?
(a) Write out a payoff matrix which summarizes the strategies and payoffs for each player in this game.
3 Consider the following game describing the agency problem between a supervisor and a laborer. Each player has two strategies. The laborer can either work or shirk, and the supervisor can either
(d) Is this game similar to any of the examples of Section 5.4?
(c) Does either firm have a dominant strategy?
(b) Set up a payoff table like those in Section 5.4, and use it to solve for the Nash equilibrium.
(a) Describe the four elements of this game.
2 Suppose there are two firms, called A and B, which compete with each other in the market for a unique product. Each firm can charge one of two prices for this product: a high price or a low price .
(b) Would this be most appropriately characterized as a non-cooperative game or a cooperative game?
(a) Imagine characterizing the relationship between OPEC members as a game. Identify the four elements of this game. You can find information to answer this question at http://www.opec.org/.
1 Representatives from the eleven member countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meet regularly to set production limits on the number of barrels of oil per day which
(d) Calculate the total revenue, total cost, and the total profit of the monopoly.
(c) Suppose that the monopoly is able to observe who is the rich and who is the poor consumer. Determine the optimal purchase fee charged to the rich consumer (AR) and the optimal purchase fee
(b) Determine the optimal price charged by the monopoly.
(a) Is this a short-run or long-run cost function? Explain.
(a) Is this a short-run or long-run cost function? Explain.
(a) Calculate equilibrium price and quantity.
26.7 Attempt to write definitions of the terms "intelligence," "thinking," and "consciousness."Suggest some possible objections to your definitions.
26.6 Under the correspondence theory, what kinds of propositions can be represented by a logical agent? A reflex (condition-action) agent?
26.5 Find and analyze an account in the popular media of one or more of the arguments to the effect that AI is impossible.
26.4 In the Brain Prosthesis argument, it is important to be able to restore the subject's brain to normal, such that its external behavior is as it would have been if the operation had not taken
26.2 Does a refutation of the Chinese Room argument necessarily prove that appropriately programmed computers are conscious?
26.1 Go through Turing's list of alleged "disabilities" of machines, identifying which have been shown to be achievable, which are achievable in principle by a program, and which are still
25.13 For the environment and motion uncertainty cone shown in Figure 25.28, find a navigation strategy that is guaranteed to reach the goal G.
25.12 We stated in our discussion of online algorithms that some special classes of environments are amenable to online algorithms with constant competitive ratios. An example is shown in Figure
25.11 Explain how to approach the problem of online navigation for a cylindrical robot of significant diameter. Does the point-robot algorithm need to be modified? What happens when the robot is
25.10 Implement a general environment in which to exercise the online navigation algorithm, such that arbitrary obstacles can be placed in the environment. Construct a specific environment
25.9 For the environment in Figure 25.26, sketch the path taken by the robot in executing the online navigation strategy. This strategy always completely circumnavigates any obstacle it encounters,
25.8 Suppose a robot can see two point landmarks L\ and LI, and that it measures the angle between them as 17°. What is the shape of the recognizable set corresponding to this sensor reading? What
25.6 Draw the cylindrical cell decomposition for the environment in Figure 25.25. With n boards in such an arrangement, how many regions would there be in the cell decomposition?
25.5 Consider the arm of a record player as a two-link robot. Let 0\ measure the elevation of the arm, and 6*2 measure its horizontal rotation. Sketch the configuration space of this robot with 6*1
25.4 Calculate the number of degrees of freedom of your hand, with the forearm fixed.
24.12 The Viterbi algorithm finds the most probable sequence of phones corresponding to the speech signal. Under the assumption that some words can be pronounced with more than one sequence of
24.11 Some sports announcers have been known to celebrate a score with the drawn out pronunciation [g ow ow ow ow ow ow el]. Draw a word HMM for "goal" such that the most probable path has a sequence
24.10 Calculate the most probable path through the HMM in Figure 24.36 for the output sequence [C1,C2,C3,C4,C4,C6,C7]. Also give its probability.
24.9 Read this chapter from the beginning until you find ten examples of homophones. Does the status of a word as a homophone depend on the accent of the speaker?
24.8 We wish to use the alignment algorithm in an industrial situation where flat parts are moving along a conveyor belt and being photographed by a camera vertically above the conveyor belt. The
24.7 In Figure 24.30, physically measure the cross ratio of the points ABCD as well as of the points A'B'C'D'. Are they equal?
24.6 A stereo system is being contemplated for terrain mapping. It will consist of two CCD cameras, each having 512x512 pixels on a 10 cm x 10 cm square sensor. The lenses to be used have focal
24.5 Show that convolution with a given function/ commutes with differentiation, that is,(/*£)'=/*£'
24.4 Edges in an image can correspond to a variety of scene events. Consider the photograph on the cover of your book and assume that it is a picture of a real 3-D scene. Identify a set of ten
24.3 Consider an infinitely long cylinder of radius r oriented with its axis along the y-axis. The cylinder has a Lambertian surface and is viewed by a camera along the positive z-axis. What will you

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